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1	Thursday, 5 September, 1946
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4	INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
5	Court House of the Tribunal
6	War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan
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8	The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
9	at 0930.
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13	Appearances:
14	For the Tribunal, same as before.
15	For the Prosecution Section, same as before.
16	For the Defense Section, same as before.
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20	(English to Japanese and Japanese
21	to English interpretation was made by the
22	Language Section, IMTFE.)
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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.
THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present
except OKAWA and MATSUI, who are represented by their
respective counsel.

Does any counsel desire to mention any matter?

Dr. KIYOSE.

DR. KIYOSE: I object to the presentation of exhibit 429 as evidence. This exhibit is a letter sent by Chao Seng, President of the High Court of Nanking, to the International Prosecution Section concerning the following points: The document attached thereto is alleged to have been written by Mei Sze Ping, but we cannot find any signature attached to this document. I have investigated the original of this document and cannot find the signature in the original either. The date on which this document was made is missing.

Mei Sze Ping was Home Minister in the former
Nanking regime, but as this regime has been overthrown
we cannot tell at this date whether he wrote it in his
capacity as Home Minister or in a more personal capacity.
Therefore, I believe that this document should not be
accepted as evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the authenticity of the

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enclosure appears to be vouched for by a high Chinese official who has signed the covering document. The things that Dr. KIYOSE mentions certainly tend to affect the probative value of the document, but, nevertheless, it may have probative value and we may have to admit it for whatever probative value it has; though you should endeavor, Captain Hummel, to meet the objections pointed out by Dr. KIYOSE.

MAJOR HUMMEL: If it please the Tribunal, this document that we have here as the original is an extract from the record of the High Court of Nanking relative to the statement made by Mei Sze Ping. The original is in Nanking as part of the record of that court.

THE PRESIDENT: You cannot improve the position?

The Court will admit it for whatever probative

value it has.

DR. KIYOSE: Does the prosecutor mean that this document was an extract from some case concerning Mei Sze Ping at the Nanking High Court.

MAJOR HUMMEL: This document is the result of an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the National Military Council of Mei Sze Ping. The result of the investigation was incorporated into the proceedings held by the High Court of Nanking, and this is that much of the

proceedings relative to Mei Sze Ping.

THE PRESIDENT: Proceed with the reading of the parts you selected.

MAJOR HUMMEL: Turning to page 4 of the English copy, which is page 5 of the Japanese copy, I quote:

"The opium business in China was the systematic policy of high ranking officials of the Japanese Government for two reasons. First, the Mongolian-Singkiang Autonomous Government, which was a puppet organization set up by the Japanese following their occupation of Inner Mongolia, sought to solve the financial deficit problems by purchasing opium in Inner Mongolia, where the people used to grow poppy and sell it at a profit. Second, Japan, in addition to scraping every possible gain in China, looked to opium as a possible way out of her own financial difficulties caused by the war. The money for Mongolian puppet government ear-marked for the purchase of opium had to be first remitted to the Finance Ministry in Tokyo, where part of the sums were retained. Although no figures of these retained sums could be estimated as they were kept strictly secret, this remains an undeniable fact. On the other hand, the greater part of the proceeds of the opium sold in Shanghai and other Chinese cities

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were also sent to Tokyo to be allotted as secret subsidiary funds to TOJO's cabinet as well as to subsidize members of the Diet. This was an open secret although it was guarded as strictly confidential, and it was known that some Japanese people at home were also opposed to this notorious policy of TOJO's cabinet. Evicence for this undeniable fact is, however, difficult to collect. (If the books of the Hung Chi Shan Tang could be obtained, some traces could be found.)"

Turning to page 5 of the English copy, which is page 7 of the Japanese copy, I continue:

"In December 1943 students held demonstrations in Nanking, Shanghai, Hangchow and other cities against opium, smashing a number of opium shops and opium dens established by the Hung Chi Shan Tang.

The public sentiment reached its peak, but the Japanese troops dared not step in to give interference. As a result, the Japanese Government sent an economic advisor to the Nanking Government, expressing their willingness to help China if China wanted to restore her pre-war opium suppression measures, on condition that the Nanking Government should consider the fact that 'opium profits were the chief revenue of the Mongolia-Singkiang Autonomous Government.' Three probable reasons for

the sudden change of the attitude of the Japanese Government regarding the opium business in China were found. First, the TOJO Cabinet had been attacked by the people both inside and outside Japan regarding the use of opium profits for political as well as secret purposes. Second, the Japanese Government wished to lessen the hatred of the Chinese people. The third and the most important factor was that Japan at that time was making scores of times as much income by the control of commodities in occupied China as from opium dealing, so there was no apprehension for lack of funds to defray political and military expenses. Consequently, the Nanking Government had to consider carefully the following points in face of the Japanese request:

"1. Since opium revenue was the chief source of income of the Mongolian Government, and if Mongolian Government could dump its opium on Nanking as a result of Japanese pressure, the Nanking Government would become an agent for selling opium imported from Mongolia.

The income of the Nanking Government was then enough to cover all expenses and the opium revenue was not considered as an important item. If the Japanese relied on increased collection of the opium tax as ground for lowering other tariffs in favor of

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Japanese merchants in China, the result would be much worse.

"3. Negotiations with the Japanese during many years proved to be painful. On every occasion they declared at first that they would never interfere. But later on they invariably interposed obstructions on every turn, making it impossible for the Chinese authorities to carry on their duties. I am afraid there could be no exception to the opium suppression problem.

"Therefore the Nanking Government took the following stand during the negotiations with the Japanese on the opium problem:

"1. The opium suppression policy of the former Military Council must be maintained and the five-year suppression plan, which was after operating for two years suspended on account of the war, must be continued. Opium evil must be eradicated within three years, beginning from April 1944.

"2. According to the pre-war regulations, the planting of poppy in Inner Mongolia should be prohibited within a definite period of time. Those pre-war measures could, of course, be temporarily allowed to continue. But the amount produced must be drastically reduced. Opium imported from Mongolia

which amounted to 3,000,000 ounces per annum by the Hung Chi Shan Tang must be reduced at least by one lalf.

"3. Rules which existed prior to the war regulating producers, dealers and addicts of opium, enforced by the former Council of Military Affairs, should be likewise observed and the Japanese authorities should lend a helping hand in this matter, giving no protection to either Japanese or Chinese ruffians.

"4. Japan should help China to stem onium smuggling, otherwise opium suppression would be impossible."

"Following the negotiations, Japanese authorities accepted the conditions completely. Wang Chin-wei, Chairman of the Council of Military Affairs happened to be in Japan for medical treatment at that time, so the Council of Military Affairs was unable to take charge of the opium suppression program as it used to do. Besides, Cheng Kung-po, Acting Chairman of the Council of Military Affairs, and concurrently Mayor of Sanghai, was too much occupied to take care of this opium suppression task. Consequently, it was assigned to the Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, regulations stipulated by the Council of Military Affairs were observed. The former opium agency was operated by specially licensed merchants under government supervision. This agency was taken over by the Central Opium Suppression Bureau for fear that continuance of the former plan would entail manipulation again by Satomi and his associates. Other functions of the Bureau remained the same as those of the former Inspector General of Opium Suppression. The Opium Suppression work from 1 April 1944 to the end of the same year is stated as follows:

"1. Since the publication of opium suppression regulations in March 1944, all narcotic producing organs in Shanghai, following the discovery of a

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trader and secret service man of the Japanese Gendarmerie, opium and narcotic dealers gradually disappeared
in the Nanking-Shanghai Area and the Japanese stopped
giving open support to opium trafficking.

"2. From April 1944 to the end of the year,
the average monthly import of opium from Inner Mongolia

number of heroin manufacturies, vanished by themselves.

The same condition prevailed in Nanking where, following

the execution of Tsao Yu-chen, a notorious narcotic

was less than 100,000 ounces - less than 40% of the monthly import in the Hung Chi Shan Tang's time.

"3. The opium smuggling continued to be

"3. The opium smuggling continued to be unchecked. But it was not more rampant than before - a fact which showed that the addicts were not increasing in number (because Government-controlled opium was reduced by more than 50%).

"4. Two opium suppression hospitals were established: one in Nanking and one in Shanghai. Public and private hospitals in various cities and districts were intrusted with the opium suppression service.

"5. The registration of opium addicts was accomplished:

"6. Opium shops and opium dens in all cities and towns were ordered to be closed down.

"Taxation on opium was not aimed at for revenue purposes by the Nanking Government. Nevertheless, 2 the total opium tax collected between April 1944 and 3 the end of the year amounted to between \$40,000,000 and 4 \$50,000,000 and was handed over to the Ministry of 5 Finance. This could be checked in the files and books." 7 The prosecution next offers in evidence its documents 9555 and 9555-B and requests that the Court 8 be permitted to give one exhibit to these two documents. 10 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 11 DEPUTY CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's 12 document No. 9555 and 9555-B will be given exhibit 13 No. 430. 14 (Whereupon, the documents above 15

referred to were marked prosecution's exhibit No. 430, and were received in evidence.)

MAJOR HUMMEL: Prosecution's document 9555-B is a letter from United States Army Military Government in Korea; subject: Production, Manufacture, Import and Export of Narcotics in Korea from 1930 to 1945, which has an enclosure consisting of statements A, B, and C, which is prosecution's document 9555.

If the Tribunal please, I will not read anything from 9555-B, but call particular attention of the Tribunal to pages 4, 5 and 6 of document 9555,

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which is on pages 6, 7 and 8 of the Japanese copy. Referring to the bottom of page 4, paragraph (2): 2 "Manufacture of narcotic drugs by the Monopoly 3 reau Medicinal Drug Factory from 1935 to 1945 inclu-4 sive (all weights in kilograms)." 5 Continuing on page 5, for the years 1938 and 6 1939 in the column marked Heroin are the figures 7 1244.000 kilograms and 1327.100 kilograms, respectively. Continuing paragraph (3): 9 "Exportation of raw opium and narcotic drugs 10 by the Korean Monopoly Bureau." And turning to page 6: 11 "b. Morphine hydrochloride and heroin (diazetylmor-12 phine hydrochloride) (Weight in kilograms)." For the 13 years 1938 and 1939, in the column marked Heroin, the 14 figures 1200.000 and 1200.000, respectively, consigned 15 16 to the Manchukuo Monopoly Bureau. The prosecution next offers in evidence its . 17 document 9553, report of the Permanent Central Opium 18 19 Board, Geneva, 29 January 1946. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 20 DEPUTY CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's 21 document No. 9553 will receive exhibit No. 431. 22 (Whereupon, the document above 23 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit 24 25 No. 431, and was received in evidence.)

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MAJOR HUMMEL: (Reading) "My dear Commissioner: "The following is a statement of the manufac-ture of diacetylmorphine in Korea declared by the Japanese Government and published by the Board in its reports to the League of Nations: "1935-39 nil "Yours sincerely, (Signed), Secretary, Permanent Central Opium Poard." 

Prosecution next offers in evidence document G e 1154. 2 n THE PRESIDENT: What is it? 4 MAJOR HUMMEL: A letter from the United r States to the Consul at Geneva, Switzerland, dated 5 g February 12, 1946, including a letter from the Chief & 7 B of the Drug Control Service of the Secretariat of the art League of Nations to the American Consul at Geneva. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted as before. 10 MAJOR HUMMEL: (Reading) 11 "The Honorable, 12 "The Secretary of State 13 "Washington, D. C. 14 "I have the honor to invite reference to 15 the Consulate's confidential despatch No. 106 of 16 January 18 in reply to the Department's telegram 17 No. 328 of November 27, 6 p.m. 1945, requesting 18 that there be obtained and forwarded from the League authorities, if agreeable to them, an 20 official statement that the Japanese Government

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Conventions.

"The Chief of the Drug Control Service of the Secretariat of the League of Nations has

and statistics required by International Drug

did not subsequent to 1939 present reports, estimates

thereof having been obtained from the Acting
Secretary General of the League. With the idea
of supplying the War Crimes Office with the most
useful documentation, a copy of the full text of
the reply of the Chief of the Drug Control Service
is transmitted herewith. This reply which would
appear to be self explanator; taken together with
the material previously supplied by the Permanent
Central Opium Board constitutes a full answer to the
Department's telegram under reference.

"Respectfully yours,

(Signed) "Howard Elting, Jr.

American Consul"

Continuing on page 2:

"Dear Mr. Elting,

"I would refer to your letter dated December 12, 1945 (reference 811.4), asking if the Japanese Government did, subsequent to 1939, present any reports on illicit traffic, annual reports, estimates and statistics, required by the International Drug Conventions.

"As statistics come within the competence of the Permanent Central Opium Board, I shall limit my answer to annual reports, reports on illicit traffic and estimates.

"No annual report, as provided under Article 21 of the Convention of July 13th, 1931 has been received in regard to Japan, and/or her territories in respect of any year subsequent to the reports covering the year 1938.

"No reports of cases of illicit traffic discovered by Japanese authorities have been received from the Japanese Government under the terms of Article 23 of the above-mentioned Convention, in respect of any year subsequent to 1939.

"As for annual estimates of drug requirements provided under Article 2 of the Limitation

Convention of 1931, the last estimates received from the Japanese Government refer to the year 1940 as regards Japan proper, and to the year 1941 for the Japanese territories (Korea, Formosa, Kwantung Leased Territory, and the Islands of the Pacific held under Japanese mandate). "I am, dear Mr. Elting, "Yours very truly, "(Signed Bertil A. RENBORG "Chief of the Drug Control Service of the Secretariat of the League of Nations, Sec-retary of the Supervi-sory Body." 

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Mantz, did you call out 2 that number? 3 CLERK OF THE COURT: No, sir. THE PRESIDENT: Well, I admitted it. You 5 did not hear me, apparently. 6 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 7 No. 1154, which was just read, received exhibit No. 8 432. 9 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit 10 No. 432 was received in evidence.) 11 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 12 MAJOR HUMMEL: Prosecution next offers in 13 evidence its document 9536: a letter, enclosure, and 14 aide-memoire from the United States Ambassador to 15 Japan on the subject, "Narcotic Drug Traffic in Occu-16 pied Areas of China," dated April 14, 1939. 17 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 18 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 19 No. 9536 will receive exhibit No. 433. 20 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit 21 No. 433 was received in evidence.) 22 MAJOR HUMMEL: (Reading) 23 "The Honorable 24 The Secretary of State, 25 Washington.

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1 "Sir:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's instruction No. 1661 of February 16, 1939, and enclosures, relating to the situation in China with respect to the traffic in narcotics and directing the Embassy, after consultation with the British Embassy, to present to the Japanese Foreign Office an aide-memoire substantially in the form of the draft transmitted with the Department's instruction under acknowledgment.

"Inquiry was made of the British Embassy whether instructions had been received from the British Foreign Office to take action along the lines proposed in the Department's instruction. As the Department's instruction was received on March 11th, and the British Embassy notified us on April 10th that instructions had been received from the British Foreign Office to inform us in the event of inquiry that the matter was still under investigation by the British Government, it was decided to carry out the Department's instruction without further delay. Accordingly, the aide-memoire, without alteration, and its enclosure, were presented to the Foreign Office on April 13, 1939.

"The official of the Foreign Office to
whom the aide-memoire and enclosure were presented
had no comment to offer other than that the contents
would be studied and a reply made in due course.

"Copies of the aide-memoire and enclosure

are transmitted herewith. A copy with enclosure had been furnished the British Embassy.

"Respectfully yours.

(Signed) "Joseph C. Grew."

"Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 3830 of April 14, 1939 from the Embassy at Tokyo

"The American Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

### "EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

"STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

#### "AIDE-MEMORIE

"The Government of the United States appreciates the efforts of the Japanese authorities and of the Japanese companies operating ships in transpacific services in connection with the suppression of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs between Japan and the United States.

"In the parts of China now under Japanese military control, however, according to reports sub-

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mitted by American officials, Japanese in authority are not taking effective measures to cooperate in the suppression of the abuse of narcotic drugs and illicit traffic therein.

"The situation existing in the Japanesecontrolled areas in China, as described in the abovementioned reports received from American officials,
is indicated in an enclosure to this aide-memoire
entitled 'The Narcotics Situation in the JapaneseControlled Areas in China'."

With the Court's permission, I will not read this next paragraph. It has already been read into evidence. Turning to page 4, the first paragraph:

"In urging upon the Japanese Government
the importance of there being exercised by the
Japanese Government the restraining influence
which it is in a position to bring to bear upon
its nationals in the occupied areas of China and
upon the regimes which have been established therein, the Government of the United States desires
to point out that the situation existing in the
occupied areas is one of deep concern to it because

"1. The evidence in the possession of this Government indicates that the heroin found in the illicit traffic in the United States has since 1935 come in large measure from the Japanese Concession in Tientsin.

"2. Practically all of the smoking opium found in the illicit traffic in the United States comes from China and is a blend of Chinese and Iranian opiums. Part of it is prepared in or near Shanghai, part in South China and a little in North China. This type of smoking opium has practically no market in China and is put up solely for the illicit traffic in America. Recent large

seizures in the continental United States, at Honolulu, and at Manila point to a substantial increase in the illicit shipment of smoking opium from the Far East to the United States, the amounts of such seized during the last six months of 1938 having been approximately fivesixths of the total amount seized during the year."

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Turning to page 7. With the Court's permission, I will not read page 6 nor page 7 down to the end of sub-paragraph (5). That has already been read in evidence.

"Since last June, the American Government has continued to receive from official sources additional alarming information in regard to the traffic in narcotic drugs in those parts of China controlled by Japan, as follows:

## "Manchuria and Jehol:

"The Director of the Opium Section of the Municipality of Harbin informed the press on May 4, 1938 that the number of unlicensed opium dens in the city of Harbin was estimated at about 1,000 as against 76 that were licensed.

"The authorities in Pinkiang Province (in which Harbin is located) estimated in June 1938 that in the Province there were approximately 2,000 Japanese and Koreans addicted to opium, morphine, or heroin.

"The Opium Administration Section of the Department of People's Welfare of 'Manchukuo' announced on August 23, 1938 that reports received from provinces and cities, in connection with the 10-year anti-opium campaign, showed that the total number

of registered addicts in Manuchuria and Jehol was 585,267.

### "Tientsin:

"In a report from the American Consul
General at Tientsin dated November 3, 1938 it is
stated that, notwithstanding an announcement in the
local press to the effect that all opium dens in the
Japanese Concession of Tientsin had been closed on
October 1, many small places in that Concession continue to dispense opium, that the larger dens in the
Japanese Concession were closed."....

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THE PRESIDENT: We cannot follow you.

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MAJOR HUMMEL: That is on top of page 3, sir.

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THE PRESIDENT: There is no "3" here.

been omitted. It is in the wrong place. It is before

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5 page 2 now.

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MAJOR HUMMEL: I am very sorry, sir. I turn the page, if your Honor please, I will give the photostatic page number rather than the page number of the document itself.

THE MONITOR: Major Hummel, will you please give us a little time to catch up with you? When you pick a certain paragraph, please give us time to find that paragraph because it is not marked; just a little time, about a minute or so, and then we can signal.

MAJOR HUMMEL: Yes.

(Reading continued) ... "but that those dens which had been operating in the Japanese Concession are now operating in the areas nominally controlled by Chinese outside the Japanese Concession, and that the number of such places operating is conservatively estimated at 500. According to a reliable informant at Tientsin, all varieties of habit-forming drugs known to the Japanese trade continue to be readily purchasable in numerous places in the Japanese

Concession.

"The daily newspaper, Yungoao, published in the Chinese language at Tientsin and controlled by the Japanese authorities, contained the statement in its issue of November 12, 1938 that the Tientsin Branch Consolidated Tax Office had received instructions from its head office in Peiping to permit the operation of an additional 23 opium dens, bringing the total of <u>licensed</u> opium dens in the nominally Chinese-controlled areas of Tientsin to 189.

"Baiping:

"It is reliably reported that the only restriction existing in Peiping in regard to establishing shops for the sale and/or smoking of opium is the payment of taxes. As a result, there were estimated to be some 300 such establishments in Peiping in October 1938. Heroin was also being sold at that time at many places in the city with no evidence of any effort being made to stamp out the trade.

"Tsinan:

"At Tsinan, since the Japanese occupation, the Tsinan Branch of the Consolidated Tax Bureau has permitted the sale of opium publicly upon the payment of certain taxes. At the end of September 1938 there

were four shops authorized to sell raw opium and 40 shops authorized to sell opium paste. By the end of November 1938 the number of shops selling opium paste had increased from 40 to 136. It was reported that, during November 1938, raw opium to the amount of 100,000 taels arrived at Tsinan via the Tsin-pu Railway from the north and that 10,000 taels of that amount were transshipped at Tsinan to other large cities and towns in the interior.

"Nanking:

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"The American Embassy at Nanking has forwarded copies of a letter dated November 22, 1938 by Professor M. S. Bates, in regard to the narcotics situation in Nanking. In the opinion of the Embassy, Dr. Bates is an experienced investigator and a man of unquestioned integrity. He states that, prior to 1938, the present generation had no known large supply and consumption of opium in Nanking nor open sale in a way to attract the poor and ignorant, especially during the five years preceding 1938, and that heroin was practically unknown. Dr. Bates' investigation disclosed that, as a result of changes brought about in 1938, legalized opium sales in Nanking amounted to \$2,000,000 monthly and that heroin sales in the area

of which Nanking is the center amounted to \$3,000,000 monthly (Chinese currency). Dr. Bates reported that, according to a private estimate, there were at least 50,000 heroin addicts in a population of 400,000. He stated that there were many young people of both sexes among the addicts; that the public opium system in Nanking, the major supplies for which are reported as coming from Dairen through Shanghai, was controlled by the 'Opium Suppression Bureau' which is under the Finance Office of the Nanking Municipal Government; and that the Bureau's regulations and by-laws were concerned mainly with bringing all private trade and consumption into the revenue net. Dr. Bates also stated:

"It is commonly reported that the Special Service Department of the Japanese Army has close and protective relations with the semi-organized trade in heroin."

"He further pointed out that:

good deal of the wholesale trade is carried on by
Japanese firms which outwardly deal in tinned goods
or medicines, but handle heroin through rooms in the
rear.'

## "Shanghai!

in forwarding copies of a series of articles by Mr.

C. D. Alcott which were published in <u>The China Press</u>
on December 4,5,6, and 7, 1938, observed that the
articles were believed to give a fairly accurate
picture of the present narcotics situation in Shanghai,
as much of the factual matter contained therein was
understood to have been obtained from the Narcotics
Section of the Shanghai Municipal Police and from the
records of the Special District Courts."

Continuing on page 11.

THE PRESIDENT: That is page 10.

MAJOR HUMMEL: (Reading)

"The Consulate General added that the traffic was most active in areas controlled by the Japanese; that no visible efforts were being made by the Japanese or the new administrations to suppress the traffic; and that the traffic appeared likely to increase in Japanese controlled areas around Shanghai.

"Pointing out that the application and enforcement of the drastic anti-narcotic laws and regulations promulgated by the National Government during the latter part of 1938 had resulted in a marked diminution in the traffic in heroin and morphine and in some decrease in the opium trade,

Mr. Alcott writes that, since the Shanghai areas came under Japanese control, heroin, morphine, and similar derivatives have been reintroduced into the area; that the importation and distribution of these drugs have been steadily increasing; that between 60 and 70 stores located in areas immediately adjacent to the International Settlement and the French Concession are now selling these drugs; that a total of about \$1,500,000 (Chinese currency)

is being spent monthly by the addicts for narcotic drugs, of which \$250,000 is spent for heroin; that an increasing number of coolies and poor laborers are using heroin and derivatives; that Jehol opium is now the chief source of supply for cheap drugs in the Shanghai area and that most of the heroin comes from Dairen and Shanhaikwan; that no effort is being made by the Japanese authorities or the Chinese administrations under their direction to suppress the traffic in nercotics in the areas controlled by them; and that, in fact, there is considerable evidence to show that many Japanese are deeply involved in the importing and sale of opium, heroin and other derivatives, including, according to some authorities on the subject, a group within the Special Affairs Organ of the Japanese military.

"The alarming description given by Mr.

Alcott of conditions in the Shanghai area is in
large measure substantiated by information received
from other reliable sources."

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1 The prosecution next offers in evidence its 2 document 9556: a letter from the Department of State 3 to Lieutenant Colonel Hornaday, dated December 26, 4 1.945. 5 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual 6 terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 8 No. 9556 will receive exhibit No. 434. (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit 9 No. 434 was received in evidence.) 10 MAJOR HUMMEL: (Reading) 11 12 "My dear Colonel Hornaday: 13 "Reference is made to despatch no. 3830, 14 dated April 14, 1939, from the American Embassy at 15 Tokyo, in regard to the traffic in narcotic drugs in the occupied areas of China. 16 "For your information and use, the records 17 of this Department disclose that the Japanese Govern-18 ment did not acknowledge the receipt of or make re-19 ply to the aide-memoire which is enclosure no. 1 to 20 the above-mentioned despatch. 21 "Sincerely yours, 22 "/s/ Otis F. Mulliken
"Chief, Division of International
Labor Focial and Health Affairs" 23 24

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That concludes the presentation of the opium and narcotics phase of this case.

THE PRESIDENT: What about the witness that is to be called whose affidavit we have?

MAJOR HUMMEL: If your Honor please, the prosecution sent a summons out yesterday for the witness MARIOKA whose affidavit was introduced, and we do not know where he is at the present time. We have contacted the Japanese Liaison Office and --

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief Prosecutor.

MR. KEENAN: I have been informed that the affiant, MARIOKA, whom we sought to bring into Court, has been interrogated by defense counsel, and I am now seeking the facts to determine in whose custody he now is. We are informed that he has been in this building and hope to produce him in a few moments.

We wish, Mr. President, to make it abundantly clear that this affiant was interrogated on the 24th of March, 1946 when a special trip was made to China, and we found that he was reported to be at Peiping. His affidavit was taken with a view of introducing that in evidence in accordance with what we thought were the provisions of the Charter; and we had no contact of any kind, nature or description with him after

that date. He was a resident of Peiping at that time, and we had no information as to his intention to remain in China or return to Japan for repatriation. Together with many thousands of other Japanese he has been repatriated without any knowledge whatsoever on the part of the International Prosecution Section.

How the defense learned of his presence, whether it was through the Central Liaison Office or its representatives, we know not, but we were not informed of his presence in Japan until the moment that the statement was made in Court by defense counsel. And for obvious reasons now, while we in an orderly manner asked for a subpoena to be issued through the processes of this Court and attempted to comply with the direction of the Court, we find him already in the hands of defense counsel, and I believe he has been with them the greater part of last night. We have never seen him; and, attempting to get him, we find he is here already. The incident in and of itself of this particular witness if not of the importance, perhaps, to justify the taking of any time, but it is of grave importance that the position of the prosecution be not misunderstood; that we are hiding any testimony or any witnesses, or, as far as

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we know, without pious utterances, attempting in any manner to present anything other than a fair case at all times to this Tribunal.

In summary, we have never seen him or heard from him directly or indirectly since the 24th of March, 1946, or approximately that date. He has, we have been informed, been in the hands of the defense, and we are perfectly willing to put him on the stand at this moment and ask to have him brought in by those who know most and best about his whereabouts.

Wolf & Yelder

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THE PRESIDENT: Doctor KIYOSE.

DR. KIYOSE: Since there seems to be some misunderstanding concerning the affiant MORIOKA, I wish to be permitted to say a few words. Yesterday in this Court I gave Prosecutor Sutton the affiant MORIOKA's address, but as I would be responsible if the address was incorrect or something, I sent a messenger to the address which I had given to Mr. Sutton.

THE MONITOR: "In order to ascertain whether he really did live there or not."

DR. KIYOSE (Continuing): Late last night having ascertained that MORIOKA was actually in the place he was supposed to be. I felt very relieved. This morning, as my house is on the way to this Court from MORIOKA's house, MORIOKA called at my house on his way to the Court. On MORIOKA's subpoena it was required that he attend this Court -- that he be present in this building in room No. 38 by eleven o'clock this morning. I had to be at this building by nine o'clock and although that would mean the time was considerably earlier than the time he had to appear, since he desired to know something about this building -since he did not know his way around in this building, I proposed that he come with me. I believe that until eleven o'clock he is waiting in one of defense counsel's

room or somewhere else and that at eleven o'clock he will appear in room 38.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, with great respect I suggest that counsel for defense might be informed, including Japanese counsel, that when this Court directs the prosecution to produce a witness, we will do it and we do not require the assistance of any of the defense counsel. We will perform our duty as we are called upon by the Court to so perform it.

THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

MR. FURNESS: Mr. MORIOKA has not been in custody at all. He has been in my room; I have been talking with him. He has not in any sense been concealed or prevented from coming in. I have not been here before so I do not know what the discussion has been, but I want to make that statement. He can come in any time at all.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, may I ask that
the Court direct whoever has him, in whomever's office,
that he be brought forthwith into this courtroom and take
the witness stand under these circumstances as our witness for cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, in view of your attitude,
we will direct that, Mr. Chief Prosecutor; but seeing
that he did not come to you and was not brought to you

by the defense but remained in association with them, it may well be that no obligation rests on you to call him now. However, you have decided to do so and the Court acquiesces.

You say a subpoena was issued, Mr. Chief Prosecutor?

MR. FURNESS: The witness' subpoena, I think, reads as eleven o'clock, so as far as I know no one has been delinquent or at fault.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, this Court already issued an order or a direction with which we attempted to comply and with reference to whose witness he is -- since we did produce an affidavit and since he is here in accordance with the Court's general ruling, we believe he should be produced.

Now, whatever testimony he gives I suppose will be confined to his testimony in chief or matters related thereto as far as he is our witness. Common sense would dictate that thereafter if the defense wishes to use him for other purposes, he ought to be their witness whenever he is called. May we have him brought in?

MR. FURNESS: He will come in. I do not like the use of the word "brought" in. He will come in without being brought in.

THE PRESIDENT: The rule that crossexamination must be confined to matters arising out of the examination in chief will apply, Mr. Chief Prosecutor. Let the witness take the stand. We will recess now for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1043 a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) 

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9 1	MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
12	Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.
d b 3	
e r 4	SUSUMU MORIOKA, called as a witness on
<b>g</b> 5	behalf of the prosecution, being first duly sworn,
& 6	testified through Japanese interpreters as follows
p 7	THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.
a 8	MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, we are not
t 9	certain whether the prosecution wants to qualify the
10	statement of the witness or not. Yesterday the affi-
11	davit was simply read; so we don't know whether to
12	begin our cross-examination or not.
13	THE PRESIDENT: He was called for the express
14	purpose of cross-examination.
15	Dr. KIYOSE.
16	DR. KIYOSE: Will you have exhibit 401, which
17	Is the affidavit of this witness, shown to the witness?
18	May I:have the Japanese translation also shown to him?
19	(Whereupon, two documents were handed
20	to the witness.)
51	THE PRESIDENT: He appears now to have care-
22	fully read the affidevit in both languages.
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1	CROSS-EXAMINATION
2	BY DR. KIYOSE:
3	Q Is the affidavit which you have just read
4	the one which you signed?
5	A So far the one that was in Chinese, I am quite
6	sure that I signed; but the text in Japanese, I read
7	this for the first time here. So far as I can see the
8	Chinese text is very different from the Japanese.
9	Q Then does the original Chinese text truly
10	represent what you said?
11	A Once more, please.
12	Q I am speaking of the original Chinese text.
13	Does it truly represent what you said?
14	A On the whole it does, but the questions and
15	answers exchanged at that time were far longer than
16	appears on this affidavit; and this affidavit is only
17	a part of those questions and answers.
18	Q I wish to question you on the points on which
19	you received interrogation from Prosecutor Sutton and
20	Chiu, but I shall confine my questions to those appear
51	ing on the affidavit in the affidavit.
22	The second paragraph from the end of this
23	affidavit, you have stated the policies of General

TERAUCHI, General SUGIYAMA, General TADA, and General

OKAMURA vis-a-vis the Chinese Incident. May I accept

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your words here as correct?

A It is as it is written in the Chinese text.

Q In the Chinese text -- does the Chinese text state that all these generals strongly urged the prosecution of the Chinese Incident?

A In the Chinese text, there is the word -phrase "on the field." By this I mean that all the
commanders on the field advocated the prosecution of
the war. In the Chinese text there is a phrase,
"on the field." By this I mean --

THE MONITOR: In the Chinese text there is a Chinese character literally meaning "attached to the ground." This I interpret as meaning "on the field," or "on the spot" -- "at the spot," and as the commander of the front line army on the field, I maintained they advocated the prosecution of the war -- battle.

Q Then may I understand that you did not mean that these generals advocated war against China before the war actually began?

A It is as you say.

Q In the same section you have testified concerning General TOJO and the war against America and Great Britain. What do you mean by the statement you made? If you remember the questions and answers exchanged at the time, please give them to me.

A At this time I was asked by the prosecution:
"Who is responsible for the China Incident?" I replied,
"KONOYE." Then they asked, "Who is responsible for
the Pacific War?" And I replied, "TOJO."

Q Then is it your understanding that the Chinese text gives in brief the questions and answers exchanged as you have stated?

A What you say is only a part of the questions and answers -- questions asked and answers given at that time. That you have just said about SUGIYAMA et cetera, and then what is written also -- after what you have stated about SUGIYAMA, et cetera, and the next question, there is a big gap which has been omitted; and there were, I believe, other questions which should be -- which were asked between the interval.

THE MONITOR: Slight correction: "Although it is in the same paragraph about SUGIYAMA, et cetera, and TOJO, between these two questions there were several other questions asked and answers given. However, that seems to be omitted here.

Q Concerning this statement about TOJO, may I understand that -- take it back.

Did you mean that TOJO urged the prosecution of war, urged war against America and Great Britain before the outbreak of this war, or do you mean, as

in the case of Generals TERAUCHI, SUGIYAMA, et cetera, that he was in favor of prosecuting the war after it had already begun?

A By this statement I meant that -- by the statement I meant that it was made after the start of the Pacific War. As I was not in Japan at the time, I am not familiar with policies of the Japanese Government at home.

THE MONITOR: Slight correction: "By this statement I meant after the outbreak of the Pacific War. Now as to the policies of TOJO before the war, I was away from Japan, so I could not possibly know what it was.

Q Did you have several opportunities to meet TOJO before and during the Pacific War?

A I did not have many opportunities to meet TOJO.

I believe it was in May, before the outbreak of the

Pacific War, I met him at a conference of division commanders.

Q Did you ever have an opportunity to listen to TOJO's ideas concerning the international situation?

A No.

Q Next, in the last paragraph of your affidavit you have testified concerning opium. I shall ask a few brief questions concerning this.

In this paragraph you have mentioned "puppet government," the words "puppet government." I suppose by these words you meant the North China Political Council. Were this Council's policies concerning opium different from those before -- from those of before?

A In 1938, when the provisional government was established in North China, the government assumed an over-all policy of prohibiting the use of opium as the former Central Chinese Government had advocated in its laws and ordinances. In 1940, I can't quite remember the date, when the provisional government was renamed the North China Political Council, they adopted a new over-all policy which they had formerly been pursuing and established new laws to that effect.

THE MONITOR: The new laws that were established were the same as the old ones, but were reissued as new law.

board.

	1	Q I have received IPS document No. 1680
M	2	from the prosecution. Is this the Opium Suppression
or	3	Law of the North China Political Council, of which
se	4	you have just spoken?
&	5	(Whereupon, a document was handed
A	6	to the witness.)
b	7	MAJOR HUMMEL: If your Honor please, it is
a	8	requested that the witness be shown the original
	9	document.
	10	(Whereupon, another document was
	11	handed to the witness.)
	12	Q That is the original. I believe it will be
	13	fairer if you examine the original.
	14	A Although I have not read the contents in
	15	detail, I believe that this is the ordinance.
	16	Q Your affidavit mentions the Opium Suppression
	17	Board. What was the extent of this Opium Suppression
	18	Board? How many employees did it have?
	19	A The Opium Suppression Board was composed
	20	of the main office and the branch office in the local
	21	districts. I don't quite remember the number exactly
	22	in the main office, but including the Section Chief
	23	I believe there is fifty or sixty.
	24	THE MONITOR: Including the chief of the

Q You have stated in your affidavit that Japanese precial commissioners participated in this Opium Suppression Board. By the special commissioners do you mean in Japanese Tzuan Yuan?

DR. KIYOSE: Not in Japanese, in Chinese.

INTERPRETER: In Chinese. I beg your pardon.

A I believe that the name "Japanese Special Commission" is a mistake in translation. At the interrogation I told the interpreter and also the Chinese prosecutor that it meant Tzuan Yuan and I even wrote the characters.

THE MONITOR: And I even wrote the characters and explained what the word was.

Q How many of these Japanese commissioners were there?

A As far as I can recollect there were only one Tzuan Yuan. His name was INOUYE.

Q Were there any other Japanese officials in the Opium Suppression Board besides this Tzuan Yuan?

THE MONITOR: At the main office.

A As far as Tzuan Yuan is concerned, there was only one, this INOUYE which I have just mentioned. However, there may have been other low officials working -- lower Japanese employees working under this INOUYE.

Were there many, or were there only a few if there were any? Even if there were, I don't believe there were 3 more than one or two. 4 When you were in North China before and after 5 the establishment of the North China Political Council, comparing before and after the establishment of the North China Political Council, do you believe that the an-8 9 nual consumption of opium was greater or lesser? 10 MR. KEENAN: I want to object to that ques-11 tion as being an improper one on cross-examination 12 based upon the subject matter in the affidavit. This 13 witness was not asked questions pertaining to that in 14 the -- as appears in the affidavit. 15 THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing about quan-16 tity in the affidavit. I think the question should be disallowed; the objection should be allowed. Then were the regulations which I just showed.

18 you, the regulations which appeared in IPS 1680, fully enforced by the activities of the Opium Suppression

21 Board?

> I regret to say that the conditions were so that it was impossible to carry out fully these regulations. This is because in territory occupied by the Japanese Army in North China there was no stable

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government to enforce those.

THE MONITOR: Political power of the government was not thoroughly felt by the people at large.

A (Continued) Because the Chinese Communists and others resisted the Japanese in the territory occupied by the Japanese /rmy, it was impossible for local administration, political administration, to be carried out and, therefore, from the beginning to the end it was impossible to enforce these opium regulations in these local districts -- fully in these local districts.

Q Was that the only cause?

A I believe there are several other reasons.

For example, in North China, to my knowledge, there were many secret opium organizations, smuggling organizations, and they were very powerful and their activities were carried on in secret and it was very difficult to break down these organizations or to arrest them, arrest the smugglers.

Q Were there any other causes such as the Japanese authorities in North China and the provisional government encouraging the increase in consumption of opium?

A The policy of the North China provisional government was to prohibit the use of opium as the

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former Chiang Kai-shek government had done because to do otherwise would not -- if otherwise it would be impossible to win the people, and in order to suppress this the army, the police, and the military police attempted its all to prevent this in China, and also a regulation was issued so that Chinese who would assume official posts could not do so if they were opium addicts and once they were found to be opium addicts they were relieved from their posts. These, I believe, are the main reasons.

Besides this I believe that the Hsin-Min Society--MR. KEENAN: Just a moment.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we should have the translation; we should have the translation, Mr. Chief Prosecutor.

A (Continued) I believe that the Hsin-min Society also organized a movement to discourage smoking of opium.

MR. KEENAN: I was about to suggest if the witness, in answer to the question, had given all the reasons, that that ought to be the end of his answer without projecting himself into further material.

Q This almost completes my cross-examination.

You have stated that the Chinese text of your affidavit
was quite different from the Japanese text of the same

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affidavit. Small things aside, are there any major points on which these texts differ? There are two main points which differ. First, 3 in regard to opium, the affidavit gives the impression that there were many Japanese committees working under 5 this Opium Suppression Board, but this isn't so and it is as I have stated a few moments before. 7 The second discrepancy is with regard to the 8 responsibility for the war. In regard to that question 9 I replied at the time that TOJO was responsible but --10 and it is stated in the affidavit as though I had 11 known this before the outbreak of the war, which is not 12 so as I wasn't in such a position to gain such know-13 ledge. 14 INTERPRETER: From reading the affidavit one 15 would gain the impression that I knew that TOJO had 16 advocated the war even before the war began, but this 17 is not so. I wasn't in such a position. 18 There were you from last night to this morn-19 ing? 20 I was at home; I was at my home. 21 Were you watched by somebody or were you under 22

By that I don't know what you mean but last

night I was at home, as I usually am, and I slept as

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somebody's power?

1	usual, peacefully.
2	DR. KIOYOSE: That is all. That terminates
3	my cross-examination.
4	CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)
5	BY MR. FURNESS:
6	Q General MORIOKA, you were in my office, were
7	you not, from 9:30 to about 10:30 this morning?
8	A Yes.
9	Q And you were free to leave at any time and
10	not under custody, were you not?
11	A Yes.
12	Q Now, this affidavit which you made on March 24,
13	1946, was made at Peiping, was it not?
14	g Yes, I made it at Peiping.
15	Q And the questions were asked you in English,
16	is that correct?
17	A. I was asked in English; I was questioned in
18	English.
19	Q And it was translated by an interpreter into
20	Japanese?
21	A Is you say.
22	Q And the affidavit which was submitted to you
23	for signature was in Chinese, is that correct?
24	A As you say.
25	Q You do not read or speak English, do you?

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L	A I can speak a little English but not as much
2	as to be able to speak with any responsibility on
3	official occasions.
4	Q So that if you signed the English version of
5	the affidavit you signed the document that you personally
6	didn't know what it contained?
7	MR. KEENAN: The prosecution objects to that
8	question. It is my understanding that he did not
9	sign any English version of the translation.
0	THE PRESIDENT: Well, it follows he did not
1	know what was in the English or the Chinese document.
2	It must have been only hearsay to him.
3	MR. KELNAN: With great respect, the prosecu-
4	tion would call the Court's attention it has had no
5	opportunity to do that before that this witness is
6	thoroughly conversant with the Chinese language. The
7	Chinese document contains a statement, is signed, and
8	it is offered in evidence in this case and, of course,
9	it is not hearsay.
0	THE PRESIDENT: If he understands Chinese,
1	if he can read it, it would not be hearsay. He appeared
2	to read it in the box certainly.
3	MR. FURNESS: It is not my intention, sir,
4	to imply that he doesn't speak Chinese.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

Q You did sign, did you not, two papers, one in Chinese and one in English?

A As far as I can remember, I am sure I signed the Chinese text but I don't believe that I signed the English text.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, with great respect, the prosecution suggests that we are wasting time because the exhibit introduced is the Chinese document and the matter of translation, or its correctness, can be properly searched into with proper experts or the auspices of the Court, but questions are being asked and time is being wasted about documents this witness never signed. He admits he signed the Chinese statement. We believe it will not be contested that he is thoroughly conversant with the Chinese language.

THE PRESIDENT: In view of the nature of the allegations against the accused TOJO, particularly, and the effect of the cross-examination to date, I think we can afford to be a bit liberal. It may be that the further cross-examination will be useless but I don't think we should shut down on it.

We will recess now until half past one.

(Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.)

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Prosecutor Sutton asked me if I could sign an affidavit 1 written in Chinese, to which I replied in the affirmative, and thereupon I signed the affidavit. 3 THE PRESIDENT: That is enough, surely. 4 When did you leave Peiping and arrive in 5 Tokyo? 6 On the 25th of May I left Peiping. On the 7 10th of June I reached Japan, and on the 12th of June 8 I arrived in Tokyo. And you have been in Tokyo ever since. Is 10 that correct? 11 On the whole I have been in Tokyo. At times 12 I have taken trips for about two or three days, but on 13 14 the whole I have resided in Tokyo. 15 Now, at the time that you were interrogated 16 by the prosecution, were you asked whether or not the 17 Japanese army or the Ko-A-In or the local North China 18 government had taken any steps to suppress opium? 19 THE PRESIDENT: Well, now, that is not a fair 20 question. It is for you to ask him whether any such 21 steps were taken, if you think he knows. 22 MR. FURNESS: I thought if he was asked that 23 question and answered it -- it was not included in the

affidavit -- it might be in point. However, I will

ask him that very question.

Q You have testified that you were with the Special Service Board and were liaison officer for the local office of the Ko-A-In; and, therefore, I assume that you are familiar with any steps taken with regard to the handling of opium. I therefore ask you whether any steps were taken to suppress the handling of opium?

A Concerning the suppression of opium in Japan-

ese occupied areas, when the Provisional Government of North China was established it continued to enforce the laws concerning suppression of opium which were in force at the time of the Chiang Kai-shek government.

Later the Wang Ching Wei regime was established in Nanking and the North China Provisional Government became the North China Political Council. At this time, as I have already testified, in August 1940, this North China Political Council promulgated a new ordinance suppressing opium.

Q And was that ordinance the Provisional Regulations Relating to Opium Suppression in North China which is included in prosecution's document 1680, which you were shown this morning?

MR. KEENAN: I object to the question as being repetitive in nature. As I understand, it has been asked and answered previously.

MR. FURNESS: I merely want to identify what

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he is testifying to now is the same thing as he testified to this morning, sir. THE PRESIDENT: Well, let him answer. There 3 may be some doubt. I do not think there is. 4 5 The ordinance you have just mentioned was one of the steps taken to suppress opium. Furthermore, 6 the Japanese army, the Chinese police, and the Japanese 8 gendarmerie and the Japanese consular police were used to arrest opium smugglers. Furthermore, the Sing Ming 10 Society conducted propaganda to the effect that opium 11 was dangerous. 12 MR. FURNESS: I now ask that prosecution's 13 document No. 1680 be marked for identification as an 14 exhibit. 15 THE PRESIDENT: I see no reason why you 16 should not tender it straight out. 17 MR. FURNESS: I tender it in evidence. 18 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted. 19 DEPUTY CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's 20 document No. 1680, tendered by the defense, is given 21 exhibit No. 435. 22 (Whereupon, the document above 23

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked defense exhibit No. 435, and was received in evidence.)

Q Did the local Chinese government and the

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Japanese authorities also organize an opium suppression board.

A As an all-out measure to enforce the supression of opium, the Opium Suppression Board was established. And in order to carry out these objects, the above-mentioned ordinance was promulgated.

Q Was it the policy of the North China Political Council and Special Service Division, the Ko-A-In, to control and suppress the production and distribution of opium?

A As you say.

Q And in carrying out this policy, did they license the sale and license the use of opium in order to effect such control and suppression?

A Opium addicts were registered and licenses were given to them, and only those with licenses were able to buy and to smoke opium. A special board investigated their qualifications, and all those who did not receive licenses were unable to buy or to smoke opium. And if they violated these regulations they were arrested.

Q And in issuing such licenses, was it the policy to only issue them to addicts who could not be cured?

A In Articles 3 and 4 of the ordinance I have mentioned before, it is stipulated that these licenses

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to sell?

1	shall be granted only to old people over fifty and to
2	younger people if they are addicts and if they should
3	suffer, if their health should suffer if they should
4	suddenly cease smoking.
5	Q Is that what you mean when you state in your
6	affidavit that "under the puppet government, opium
7	could be openly sold and bought under the control of
8	the so-called Opium Suppression Board"?
9	MR. KEENAN: If the Court please, I object to
10	that question. We think that what the witness meant
11	by his language is for this Court to determine and not
12	for interpretation under the special circumstances of
13	this witness' appearance in court today.
14	THE PRESIDENT: The question would be unobject
15	tionable if it was put in this form: Was epium openly
16	sold only to confirmed addicts?
17	MR. FURNESS: Could I add to the Court's
18	question: who had been licensed to purchase by
19	sellers who had been licensed to sell.
20	THE PRESIDENT: Well, put a question on those
21	lines.
22	Q Was it the policy under these ordinances to
23	allow the sale of opium only to addicts who had been
24	licensed to purchase by sellers who had been licensed

MR. KEENAN: We object to that question.

Just as you have stated.

MR. KEENAN: Is this light clear?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go ahead.

MR. KEENAN: Prosecution objects to that question on the ground that the law or ordinance speaks for itself. Recourse to the document, exhibit 435, I believe, will show that it is under the finance provisions for collection of revenue. Otherwise, the law itself will speak its own policy without interpretation of this or any other witness.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the law in China is a question of fact in this jurisdiction. But you have set out in his affidavit that opium was sold openly. That is an ambiguous expression which can be cleared up. It may mean openly sold to everybody or openly sold to some only. And Major Furness is entitled to have that cleared up.

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MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, if the Northern lights have finished, I would like to continue with what I have to say. I do not know whether the system is off or not. Can you hear me?

THE PRESIDENT: I can just barely hear you, Mr. Keenan. I think you had better wait until the power goes on.

MR. KEENAN: I think the current is on.

To make our position clear, Mr. President, prosecution begs leave to agree with the Court that the practice of how sales were made is pertinent, or any ambiguity in the affidavit with reference to the practice of sales is pertinent. But, this question is cumningly devised: It asks this witness as to the policy of this law. The law will speak for itself.

We, therefore, object to the question in this form and suggest that the proper inquiry might be as to what this witness knows of the practice of the sale. And, if this witness wishes to say that "openly" means "selling to those who have licenses and who comply with the law," we are willing to leave that for ultimate question of credibility.

MR. FURNESS: If I was cunning, your Honor, it was due to inadvertence rather than design. I

1	would like to broaden the question. Could it be
2	read?
3	THE PRESIDENT: Omit any reference to the
4	law. Just ask him what were the facts. That is how
5	I put it to you, Major Furness, and that will be un-
6	objectionable.
7	BY MR. FURNESS (Continuing):
8	Q In your statement that "under the puppet
9	government, opium could be openly sold and bought
10	under the control of the so-called Opium Suppression
1	Board," do you mean that it could be openly sold to
.2	persons licensed to sell to buy by persons licensed
.3	to sell?
4	A Just as you say.
.5	Q Was it the belief of the persons in the
.6	Ko-A-In and the other persons dealing with this
.7	matter that by permitting such sale under license
.8	the use of opium could be suppressed as distinguished
9	from clandestine sales behind closed doors?
0	MR. KEENAN: Object to that question.
1	THE PRESIDENT: Will you read the question
2	again?
3	(Whereupon, the last question was
4	read by the official court reporter.)

THE PRESIDENT: What is your ground of

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1 objection, Mr. Keenan? MR. KEENAN: The ground of the objection 2 is this witness interpreting the belief of an organ-3 4 ization. I think he might be permitted to give his own view on that subject, but I don't think he has 5 6 the right to interpret the views of others. 7 MR. FURNESS: I think the question is admissible. I am not particularly proud of it. 8 9 THE PRESIDENT: I think the objection should be upheld; but, as the Chief Prosecutor sug-10 gests, you might ask the witness what was his view. 11 12 Was it your belief that, by permitting this sale under license to persons licensed to buy, that 13 the use of opium could be suppressed as distinguished 14 from the clandestine sales behind closed doors? 15 THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean: Did the 16 licensing system --17 MR. FURNESS: Result in control. 18 THE PRESIDENT: (Continuing) -- result in 19 prevention of illegal sales? 20 MR. FURNESS: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Well, did it, witness?

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THE WITNESS: I believe that this system was an effective measure in carrying out the policy of suppressing opium as a whole. That is to say, by

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permitting the open sale of opium only to licensed people, the control and suppression of opium as a whole could be enforced.

Q It was impossible, was it not, to suppress it entirely?

You testified this morning that some opium was smuggled into the Japanese occupied territory.

Could you tell us whether those smugglers were of Japanese or Chinese origin?

A Within my knowledge, opium smuggling is a trade established in China from long ago, and opium smugglers have a secret and complex organization.

Most of the smugglers were Chinese; a part of them were Japanese and Koreans who had Japanese citizen. ship. There were also citizens of other countries.

Q And during the time that the Chiang Kaishek Government was in control, was this same smuggling -- and there were sales of opium, clandestine sales of opium, were there not?

MR. KEENAN: Object to that as being certainly without the scope of the affidavit or the testimony in it.

THE PRESIDENT: It is almost common knowledge, of course, matters like that. The objection is upheld.

in English.

Q This morning, in answer to Dr. KIYOSE's questions, you stated that the English translation referring to Japanese special commissioners as participating in the work of the Opium Suppression Board was incorrect and substituted for "Japanese Special Commissioners" a Chinese or Japanese term. Will you tell us what that term was?

THE PRESIDENT: Do you ask him to repeat an answer or part of an answer?

MR. FURNESS: No, sir. I just want to

find out what that term means in English.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he is not proficient

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, I had understood the position was taken that this witness did not speak English, but defense counsel seem to know far more about the witness than we do; and I will not press it if they tell us that they know that he does speak English, because obviously he would not be qualified to tell us what it means in English unless he does have knowledge of that language.

MR. FURNESS: I know he does not speak
English; but I thought that the interpreters, when
he gave the Japanese word, might interpret it in
English.

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THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you are taking your own cross-examination very seriously at this stage, Major. But do consider us; we haven't much time to spare. By this time you may have induced the wit-5 ness to explain away almost all that he said in his 6 7 affidavit, if not all of it, and he may not be of 8 much use for any other purpose. 9 BY MR. MIRNESS: (Continuing) 10 Did the Japanese Government make any efforts to cure opium addicts of the opium habit? 11 12 If so, what? 13 THE PRESIDENT: In view of this witness' per-14 formance in the witness box, it may not be worth-15 while to cross-examine him about those matter.

MR. FURNESS: There is just only one other question.

Even after the general policy was put under the Ko-A-In, was the administrative work with regard to opium under the jurisdiction of the commanding officer of the military division in the particular area?

The general administrative work concerning opium was in charge of the Chinese Government in that area. The policies decided by the Ko-A-In concerning

## CROSS REDIRECT

1	opium were decided upon after consultation with
2	Japanese Army Headquarters on the spot; and, after
3	mutual agreement had been reached, this policy was
4	transmitted to the Chinese Government there.
5	Q The summons under which you came to this
6	Court required you to appear, did it not, at eleven
7	o'clock this morning?
8	A Originally, I had the intention of coming
9	at eleven o'clock without knowing whether I was to
10	appear in the courtroom itself or whether I was only
11	summoned for preparatory interrogations.
12	Q But the summons said to appear at eleven
13	o'clock, did it not?
14	A It merely said to come to room 38 by
15	eleven o'clock.
16	THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further
17	cross-examination?
18	Mr. Chief Prosecutor.
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20	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
21	BY MR. KEENAN:
22	Q You have seen exhibit 401?
23	A I looked through it a short while ago.
24	Q Does it contain your signature in the
25	English language?

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A Yes.

Q Did you write that yourself or did someone else write it for you?

A I wrote it myself.

Q Does the document 401 -- exhibit 401 -- contain your signature in the Chinese language?

A Yes.

Q And also in the Japanese language?

A This is the first time I have seen the Japanese text. I never knew that a Japanese text existed until today.

Q I did not ask you about the Japanese translation because the matter of translation into Japanese or English is a matter to be corrected in this courtroom. I am asking you if you signed your name to this 401 document, the body of which is written in Chinese -- if you signed your name in the Chinese and Japanese character?

A I signed my name in Japanese. The Japanese characters are the same as the Chinese characters.

Q How many pages are there to that exhibit 401 that had been handed to you be re you now?

A Three pages.

Q How many times did you sign your name in English and in Japanese and Chinese characters on

that document?

A I signed once on each page.

Q Calling your attention to the last paragraph,
I am quoting: "The statement above was voluntarily
made by myself." Did you read that statement before
you signed three times, as you stated?

- A Yes, I did read that.
- Q Did you understand 1t?
- A Yes, I understood them.
- Q Was it and is it true?

MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, unless these questions are being asked by the prosecution for the purpose of impeaching his own witness, we object to them.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, if the purposes of many of the questions asked in cross-examination -if there were any purposes to them -- were directed towards an effort to show that this witness in some way was confused in what he said, we wish to show that he made the statement voluntarily. And that's cn'y one of the questions; there are one or two more for the purpose of showing it was done voluntarily and after carefully reading, and that they record the truth without mistake. That has been, I believe, at least by implication, questioned by the

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defense. If they concede that they make no contest on that point, we certainly will attempt to shorten this trial by asking no more questions along that line. 

Wolf & Yelden

THE PRESIDENT: The difficulty is this, as I see it, Mr. Chief Prosecutor. If he answers that question "No," he incriminates himself according to the law of China where he made the false affidavit.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, respectfully, that is not the ground of the objection, and I would suggest that, with the wise observation of the Court, we might -- the witness might be informed that he needs to answer no question that might incriminate him, but otherwise we would like to have pertinent questions replied to.

THE PRESIDENT: Then there is another objection. You are, in effect, treating him as hostile and he has not been so declared.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, with great respect, that is not the purpose of this interrogation. I understand, and I may be in error, that the defense has challenged this affidavit as representing the views of this witness and I respectfully suggest that under the rather unusual circumstances surrounding his appearance in Court, that perhaps, too, the prosecution might be allowed a little bit of liberty in attempting—

THE PRESIDENT: Then, strictly speaking, it is new matter. It is not something arising out of the cross-examination and which is directed to explain

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anything said in cross-examination, and the question can be asked only with the permission of the Tribunal. Above all, what is the practical value of a simple affirmative answer to that question in view of the cross-examination? Is not this Court going to be determined by the nature and the effect of the cross-examination and not by his simple "Yes" or "No" to a more or less formal question. However, I speak for myself only and the majority of the Court may desire to allow you to ask the question.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, I do not think
it is of sufficient importance to take a great amount
of time and I withdraw the question.
BY MR. KEENAN: (Continued)

Q Mr. MORIOKA, were there any changes made in the paper that you signed as it was prepared and before you signed it?

A One or two corrections were made. There were also a few parts where the Chinese and Japanese meanings were different, but on the whole I considered that the affidavit was correct and did not make any further corrections.

Q Were those corrections made at your suggestion before you signed it?

A I -- the corrections -- there are corrections-

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some corrections which I made myself with my own pen. There are a few other places where the Chinese meaning and the Japanese meaning were different, but I left it as it was at the time.

For example, as I have already stated in paragraph four of my affidavit, since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1937, the Army leaders, namely, General TERAUCHI, General SUGIYAMA, General TADA, and General OKAMURA, all strongly urged the prosecution of this war in China, but the war against the U.S.A. and Great Britain was advocated by TOJO. These lines, as I have already pointed out, and as Mr. Sutton himself is aware -- at the time I was interrogated this was not the way the questions and answers went. The question was, "Who was responsible for the Pacific war?" and I simply replied, "MOJO." Again concerning the China Incident, the question was, "Who was responsible for the China Incident?" and I replied, "KONOYE."

I see -- later I saw that the Chinese text had been -- had used the words, "urged" and "advocated," but now, thinking it over, I see that if these words are used, the question of from when they advocated these things will arise.

MR. KEENAN: Is there any way of shutting

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		The state of the s
		off this waterfall of language?
	1	THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now
	2	for fifteen minutes.
	3	(Whereupon, at 1445, a recess
	4	was taken until 1500, after which the pro-
	5	ceedings were resumed as follows:)
G	6	MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
0	7	Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.
d	8	BY MR. KEENAN (Continuing):
e		Q Exhibit 401 that you have before you is
g	10	written in Chinese only, is that correct?
& Spr	12	A Yes.
	13	Q And the Japanese and English translations,
	14	state whether or not you saw them before you came into
att	15	the courtroom today.
•	16	MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, this
	17	question has been asked of this witness and already
	18	answered.
	19	MR. KEENAN: I do not recall it has, your Honor
	20	I believe I know it to be a fact that he had only the
	21	Chinese writing before him at the time his statement
	22	was taken, but even though it may be repetitious I
	23	hope it is not may the witness answer this question
	24	for clarification?
	25	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, because I do not recall

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myself whether it was or not.

MR. KEENAN: May I repeat the question so the witness may not be confused?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

## BY MR. KEENAN:

Q State whether or not you ever saw the English or Japanese translation of exhibit 401 before you came into the courtroom?

A The Japanese text of this affidavit I saw when Dr. KIYOSE handed -- had it handed to me in the witness box this morning. As for the English text, I have not yet seen it as a whole. Just before I entered this courtroom I noticed the English text of the affidavit lying on the desk of an American defense counsel, but I did not read it.

Q So that you may state whether the corrections that you said you made were corrections only to the Chinese writing, exhibit No. 401?

A Only the Chinese text. I corrected it at Peiping.

Q And the last statement reads as follows:
"The statement was recorded by Mr. Henry Chiu, and
that recording was read by myself and affirmed by
myself to be true without any mistake." Was that
contained in exhibit 401 before you signed it?

A Yes.

Q Was that statement true?

THE PRESIDENT: You withdrew a similar question before, Mr. Chief Prosecutor. It really is not worthwhile.

asked -- the statement has been made that this witness has not been declared hostile. The prosecution
will not declare a witness hostile unless it believes
under the circumstances of this nature that he has
committed perjury or is in contempt of court. Then,
and only then, will it declare a witness hostile; and
thereafter will ask that the witness be held, as we
intend to do in this Court, until an adequate investigation be made to see if, in the interests of justice
and for the dignity of this trial, proper steps cannot
be taken as the circumstances shall warrant.

THE PRESIDENT: It is the Court that declares it. In Australian and I think in all British jurisdiction, it is the Court that makes the declaration of hostility.

MR. KEENAN: In our jurisdiction, Mr. President, that is done usually upon the challenge of the party that offers the witness. I don't see that it makes a great difference.

THE PRESIDENT: May I just say this, Mr.
Chief Prosecutor. You were not merely asking this
witness to explain answers in cross-examination,
but you were directly challenging those answers.
You were saying, in effect, "Weren't you telling
lies because didn't you make this statement that
your affidavit was true?" We must look at the
substance of things, and that was your attitude
undoubtedly. Of course, the need for declaring
a witness hostile on reexamination is not so great
because you are entitled to lead there; and when you
ask a witness whether what he said in an affidavit
was true, you are really challenging his veracity.
In other words, you are impeaching his credit.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, I think a careful perusal of the cold record of the questions that I have asked might lead this Court to come to the conclusion that I am searching from this witness to determine whether or not he made any error. I know the purpose of this inquiry. I may not be making it plain. I cannot object to my language being interpreted as the Court sees fit, but I can take exception to the Court stating what my purpose is. I am not attempting at this time to impeach this witness. I am trying to find out whether he should be

impeached or not. I want to know if he understood what he was signing.

THE PRESIDENT: I will simply hear what

THE PRESIDENT: I will simply hear what you have to say and put it to my colleagues. It is immaterial to me how it is decided. I can only state the laws and the practices as I understand and I do not want any heat introduced into any debate in this Tribunal.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, the prosecution at no time has stated that this witness lied or uttered any abusive language to any witness, this or any other. I am attempting to find out from this witness whether he understood what he was signing because the defense has directly, at least indirectly, charged that there is some doubt in the witness' mind as to what he was signing or the very import of it.

THE PRESIDENT: A majority of the Court upholds the objection to the question, "Was it true..."
You may ask the question, "Did you understand what you were asked to sign?"

MR. KEENAN: Did I correctly understand the Court Mr. President, to state that the objection was upheld or was overruled?

THE PRESIDENT: The objection is upheld insofar as you ask the question of the witness, "Was it true

that he did a certain thing?"

the ruling of the Court, but I beg leave to remind the Court respectfully that in every case before where a witness made an affidavit and it was filed in this case and he was found to be present, the question has always been permitted and has been universally followed of asking the witness if he did sign the affidavit, and if it were true. We never have had an opportunity to do this before. We are now departing from the regular procedure of the Court, but I abide by the Court's ruling.

entirely different on the previous occasions to which you refer. No question was raised. There was no objection. Moreover, there was no doubt then, no debate as to the veracity of the witness. However, the question is sharply reised, and we have to decide it.

MR. KEENAN: In other words--

THE PRESIDENT: But we agree that you may ask the witness did he understand what he was asked to sign.

BY MR. KEENAN: .

Q Exhibit 401, did you carefully read it and

understand it in Peiping before you signed it? 1 At the time it was already past one A. M. 2 I read the Chinese text, saw that it was on the whole 3 in line with what I had said, and signed it. Am I to take that -- correction -- is the 5 Court to take that, Mr. MORIOKA, as your reply, that 6 you did understand it, or you didn't understand it? 7 Please understand that I did understand its 8 A 9 contents -- the contents of the text. 10 The interview you had at Peiping in March 11 with Mr. Sutton, did you see anyone before the inter-12 view took place that day concerning the matter involved? 13 A No. 14 And was the interview over that same day or 15 evening? 16 The prosecutor came to my house at ten P. M., 17 and I believe the interrogation was finished around 13 one-thirty the next morning. 19 And did you see anyone from the prosecution 20 from that day to this? 21 A No. 22 Or communicate with anyone from the prosecution 23 from that day to this? 24 A No. 25 When was the first you heard again concerning

this matter after your return to Japan? This morning before coming to this Court I dropped in the office of American defense counsel and heard of this for the first time. 

Abram & Morse

? What defense counsel?

A The person at your left.

Q There are several at my left. Major Furness here?

A Yes.

4 How did you happen to go to his office?

A Yesterday I received a notice from my local police station that I was wanted at Room 38 of the former War Ministry Building, this morning. Soon after a messenger came from Dr. KIYOSE, saying that he had given someone my address, but in order to ascertain whether it actually was my address. I told him that the address was as he had given and that I had received a notice from the police.

THE MONITOR: And that messenger went home - went back.

A (Continued) About 8:00 a.m. I left
my -- I believe it was around 8:00 a.m. this morning,
since I didn't know what I was being called about, and
since Dr. KIYOSE's messenger had come in order to
make sure my address, I dropped in at Dr. KIYOSE's on
my way to the War Ministry Building. As Dr. KIYOSE
was just then about to leave for the War Ministry
Building, I came together with him.

Q What time did you hear from the messenger

from Dr. KIYOSE, what time in the morning?

A I went to Dr. KIYOSE's -- I called at Dr. KIYOSE's house about 8:00 o'clock this morning, but I don't remember when the messenger came -- just exactly what time the messenger came.

MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, we object to further questions along the lines taken by the Chief Prosecutor here, on the ground it was not brought out on any - the subject matter on which he is now examining was not brought out on cross-examination, and furthermore we think it is an attempt to attack this witness' credibility.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, originally the propriety of the filing of this affidavit without presenting this witness was brought to the attention of the Court, at least by strong implication, by the defense. We are attempting to find out the circumstances surrounding this witness' appearance in the defense counsel's office when he was under subpoena to appear before the Court. We have had an explanation from Dr. KIYOSE, which is not, to state it mildly, is not entirely satisfactory at this time to the prosecution as to its accuracy. And, Mr. President, there is more than a faint suspicion of this witness having shifted his views from the time

he made this affidavit until his appearance in this court room, and we would like to inquire as fully as the ethics of the occasion permit as to the circumstances and what caused, if anything, the shift in his views and position.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, now, the position is transparently plain. The prosecution challenges the veracity, or the incredibility, of its own witness. The only thing left is whether Major Furness should be disciplined. We have to hear Major Furness on that. We do not want any of these side issues. We have enough to decide without that, but we will discipline him if necessary.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, with the solemn duty imposed upon the prosecution by this Charter and myself as such Chief of Counsel, I find it my duty to make inquiry with reference to what seems to me a palpable change of position on the part of a witness.

THE PRESIDENT: We are concerned, in the first place, with the credibility, which you have almost destroyed. We are concerned, in the second place, with the conduct of Major Furness. If you want that investigated we shall investigate it.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, with great

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me for a moment, it has been my habit and experience as a prosecutor before I make charges to investigate and to develop. I am making no charges at this time, but I am inquiring of this witness about what appears quite clear to me to be a shift of position upon his part. I am sure the Court would not want to accelerate or hurry the prosecution into the position of making charges, and I am quite certain that the Court is very anxious to know about all shifts of position. I am asking questions objectively. I have never mentioned Major Furness' name. I am not responsible for these facts, but I shall attempt —

THE PRESIDENT: You didn't name Major

Furness, but the witness did in reply to you, Mr.

Chief Prosecutor. I do think, if I may make a suggestion -- I hope I have the support of my colleagues that the witness now leave the box and that we forget all about Major Furness.

MR. KEENAN: And when we do, Mr. President, the cold record will show that his name was brought into this case by the witness and commented upon by the President, and not by myself.

THE PRESIDENT: It would be impossible to condemn Major Furness on the uncorroborated testimony

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of such a witness as that, in view of the prosecution's attitude towards the witness.

You are called upon, sir, Major Furness, to explain nothing.

MR. FURNESS: I do not like, if your Honor please, to have any implication charged that I attempted to change this witness' position, to influence his testimony, or to bring out more than what I considered the full truth and to which he could testify truthfully. I make this statement so that it will so appear upon the record.

MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, I want the record to show that there has been no charge made by the prosecution of misconduct on the part of any American counsel in this case.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness may go, on the usual terms.

(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

THE PRESIDENT: I understand, Mr. Hauxhurst,
that you are about to open at some length on the next
phase, economic aggression in China and Greater East
Asia.

MR. HAUXHURST: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Under those circumstances, we will hear your opening tomorrow.

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We will adjourn now until half past nine tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1550, an adjournment was taken until Friday, 6 September 1946, at 0930.)